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Al~traet---Combat games are formulated as zero-sum differential games with unilateral event constraints. 
An interior penalty function approach is employed to approximate optimal strategies for the players. The 
method is very attractive computationally and possesses uitable approximation and convergence 
properties. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent series of papers [1-3], a mathematical formulation of combat games was proposed. By 
combat is meant a dynamical encounter in n dimensional space X = ~n between two players, or 
opponents, u and v, both of whom have offensive capabilities and objectives. The state transition 
is governed by a set of n ordinary differential equations 
dx 
d--t =f(t ,  x, u, v), (1) 
with state x = x(t)~ X and controls u = u(t)E U c ~'~ and v = v (t)~ V c ~P, where U and V are 
compact subsets. The initial time is to and the initial state is X(to)= Xo. 
Associated with the players are target sets ~ and ~ in event space ~ x ~n, where o~ and ~ are 
closed and there exists a time t *> to such that (t, x)~ ~c~ for all (t, x) such that t >i t*. 
The game is said to terminate at time ~ where 
T.'= inf{t/> t01 (t, x) ¢ int[~ u ~]}. (2) 
Thus T ~< t* and it is the objective of each player to terminate the game in his own target set while 
avoiding that of his opponent. If a player achieves this goal he is said to win the game. For each 
initial event he combat game can end with one of the following four outcomes: (a) player u wins, 
(b) player v wins, (c) a draw (the game terminates with t = t*), and (d) joint capture (both players 
win with ~ < t*). 
We shall adopt the concepts of strategy, value and saddle point as formulated in Friedman [4] 
with which the reader is assumed to be familiar. We shall say that a player's trategy is winning 
if it ensures him a win against all possible strategies of his opponent. Assuming that for a given 
event only one player can win (say u), u's optimal strategy is determined so as to minimize over 
all his winning strategies the cost functional J = Ju given by 
J =g(x(T) ]+ h[t,x(t),u(t),v(t)]dt. (3) 
0 
His opponent v chooses his optimal strategy so as to maximize J. The resulting differential game 
is a zero-sum game with unilateral event constraint ((t, x) ¢ int(~)Vt ~ [to, t-] that u endeavors to 
satisfy and v to violate. 
It will be assumed throughout the paper that the initial event is in u's winning zone, i.e. that 
u is the winning player and hence u is the minimizer and v the maximizer of the cost functional. 
We shall make the following assumptions about the functions f, g and h: 
Assumption I. f ( t ,  x, u, v) satisfies uitable smoothness conditions that guarantee unique solution 
on [to, t*] for all measurable functions u(t), v(t) with values in U and V respectively. 
Assumption 2. h(t, x, u, v) is continuous in [to, t*] x ~F' x U x V. 
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Assumption 3. The functions f and h are separable in u and v, that is 
f ( t ,  x, u, v) =fl  (t, x, u) +f2 (t, x, v), (4) 
h(t, x, u, v) = hi(t, x, u) + h2(t, x, v). (5) 
Assumption 4. g(x(t)) is continuous on ~". 
Assumption 5. For each (t, x), 
max min h(t, x, u, v) > 0. (6) 
t ,~V u~U 
In the ensuing discussion we develop an interior penalty function approach to solve event 
constrained ifferential (combat) games. 
2. EXISTENCE OF VALUE AND SADDLE POINT IN EVENT-CONSTRAINED 
DIFFERENTIAL  GAMES 
We derive in this section some preliminary results (in the spirit of Friedman [4]) on which our 
approach hinges. 
Let (t, x) be any point of 0~7~, (the boundary of ~) .  We shall say that (t, x) is nonusable for v 
if there exists a z7 ~ U such that for all v ~ V and all outward normals r /= r/(t, x) to ~ at (t, x) 
qT . f (t ,  x, ~, v) >. O. (7) 
The point (t, x) is called strictly nonusable if the above inequality holds strictly. 
We shall denote by A and F strategies of u and v, respectively. It is clear that if for a winning 
strategy A (of u) and any strategy F (of v), the corresponding trajectory contains points of O~,  
they must be nonusable. In fact, we shall assume throughout he ensuing discussion that all such 
points of O ~, are actually strictly nonusable. We shall denote the set of all strictly nonu~ble points 
of c~,  by 0~'~. We introduce now the following parametrization. 
Let ~, be given by a set of inequalities 
{(t, x) <. 0; i = 1 . . . . .  I}, (8) 
where ~i(t, x) are C 2 functions. The admissible region )7, of the game is then the union of the 
complement of ~,, and of nonusable points of 0 ~,. 
For each i = 1 . . . . .  I let/~i(t, x) be defined by 
Mt, x),= x) + I i(t, x)l]/2, (9) 
where I" I denotes the absolute value, and let 
I 
x) ,= Mt,  x). (10) 
i= l  
Then/~(t, x) is nonnegative, and equals zero if and only if (t, x) ~ ~,. 
We need the following additional assumptions: 
Assumption 6. The strictly nonusable part d,~-~ of ~ , ,  is C 2. 
Assumption 7. The derivatives Of(t, x, u, v)/Oxj, 1 <<, i j <~ n exist in some open neighborhood 
containing d ~-~.. 
Assumption 8. For every (t, x) ~ d~'~ there exists an open neighborhood JV" of(t, x) on 05~'~ with 
C 2 coordinates t, 01 . . . . .  0._ ~. 
From the assumptions (A6) and (AS) it follows that for each point ( t ,x)e~'~,  
(t, 0,/~) = (t, 01 . . . . .  0,_ i,/~) forms a C 1 coordinate system in some Xu neighborhood M of (t, x). 
Therefore the differential system (1) can be written locally in M in the form 
~t =~(t,O,B,u,v);  i= l , . . . ,n -1  
~t = f,(t, O, [3, u, v), (11) 
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and for each (t, x) ~ M, 
max minf.(t,  0, 1~, u, v) > 0. (12) 
vE  V t, lt U 
Assumption 
derivatives 
9. (1) There exists 
OOj 
bij(t),= ~ O~(t, O, ~,u, v) 
OB 
a positive number Eo such that for i = 1 . . . . .  n the partial 
j= l , . . . ,n -1 ,  
(13) 
exist and are continuous for all (t, 0, 13) such that 0 ~< 13 ~< E 0 and all control functions u(t) and v(t). 
(2) Consider now any pair of control functions u (t) and v (t) for which the corresponding trajectory 
satisfies 0 ~< 13 ~< Co in some subinterval (~, f) of (to, t*) and let the bu(t ) be defined as in (13) for 
these functions. For C > 0 consider the linear system 
dz, = ~ bii(t)z/; i= l  . . . . .  n; ?<~t ~,  (14) 
dt /=l 
with 
z , ( t )  = l ,  I z , ( t ) l  < c ;  i = 1 . . . . .  n - l ;  (15)  
then there exists a positive number 00 independent of u(t) and v(t), ?, ~'(but dependent on C) such 
that 
z,(t)>~Oo if T~<t ~<~. (16) 
Recall that a pair of strategies (A*, F*) is called an ~, saddle point if (i) the trajectory 
corresponding to (A*, F) is winning for u for all F, (ii) the value exists and equals J(A*, F*) and 
(iii) for any admissible pair of strategies (A, F) the following inequalities hold: 
j(6,, r)  ~< J(a*, r*) ~< y(a, r*). (17) 
The following central theorem can be proved: 
Theorem 2.1 
Assume that conditions (AI)-(A9) all hold and let (to, Xo) be in the interior of u's winning zone. 
Then the differential game associated with (1), (2), (3) and with event constraint (t, x )¢  int(~), 
to ~< t ~< ?, has both value and an )7 u saddle point. 
Theorem 2.1 depends among other things on the following lemma which we shall need 
independently below. 
Lemma 2.2 
Assume that conditions (A1)-(Ag) all hold and let (to, x0) be in the interior of u's winning zone. 
Then there exists c* > 0 such that for each 0 ~< e ~ E* there exists a winning strategy A(E) for u 
for which, given any strategy F of v, the corresponding trajectory satisfies the condition that 
130, x) 1> E for all to ~< t ~< ?. 
In closing the present section we should like to emphasize that the existence of ~, saddle point 
strategies for the event constrained games does not imply that optimal feedback strategies exist. 
Indeed, the strategies computed via the Isaacs equation may be invalid on the boundary of the 
constraint set, a fact that can be illustrated by simple examples. To overcome the resulting 
difficulties we employ below a penalty function approach that, for almost all (t, x) in .~,, yields 
arbitrarily close feedback approximations to the ~u saddle point strategies for the players. 
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3. INTERIOR PENALTY FUNCTION APPROACH 
Let y :(0, oo)-+ ~+ be a C ~ function satisfying the conditions that: 
Condition B1. 7(fl) is monotonically decreasing, i.e. dy/dfl <~ O. 
Condition B2. 
lim y(fl) = o¢. 
/~0  
Condition B3. For any/~0 > 0, 
Two examples of functions atisfying the above conditions are 
:,(/~) =/~-' 
and 
(18) 
{0~// - '+ /~/1 - ' -2 ,  for O</~</L ~(/~) = for /~ </~, (19) 
where ~ is any positive constant. 
We define now the penalty function 
i 
Jp:= /~(t, x) dt (20) 
0 
where # (t, x),= y (fl (t, x)). From condition (B3) it follows easily that if a trajectory approaches ~ ~ 
then J. goes to infinity. More specifically the following theorem holds true: 
Theorem 3.1 
Let Jp be defined by (20) and assume conditions (A1) and (B3) hold. Then for every positive 
number .9' there exists a number esuch that if along a trajectory of( l)  inf(fl(t, x)) ~< e then Jp >t ~.  
Let r be a positive number and consider now the cost functional 
f ,= J  + rJp (21) 
instead of the cost functional J of (3). It is readily noted that Theorem 2.1 remains true if (21) 
replaces (3) and, in fact, since Jp is unbounded, the saddle point of the game with payoff (21) will 
always yield an interior trajectory so that the event constraint can be removed. Thus, we formulate 
for r the unconstrained differential game defined by (l), (2), and (21) and obtain the following: 
Theorem 3.2 
Assume that conditions (AI)-(A9), (B1)-(B3) hold and let (to, x0) be in the interior of u's 
winning zone. Then the (unconstrained) differential game associated with (1), (2) and (21) has value 
and an ~u saddle point as well as optimal feedback strategies almost everywhere. 
Thus, for every positive number  the unconstrained "penalty game" defined above has optimal 
feedback strategies almost everywhere that can be computed by employing the Hamilton-Jacobi 
necessary conditions (Isaacs equation) for optimality (or for that matter, any other computational 
technique). 
We shall show next that by suitable selection of the parameter r, arbitrarily close approximation 
of strategoes for the original constrained differential game will be obtained. 
First we note that with (21) replacing (3), the essential objectives of the two playerse are still 
maintained. In particular, the minimizer u wishes to prevent constraint violation and hence is 
penalized if the trajectory gets too close to the constraint boundary. The maximizer, v on the other 
hand, wishes to cause constraint violation if he can, and hence his objective is enhanced by the 
incentive given him through the penalty term. 
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Consider now a decreasing sequence of positive numbers {rk } with rk ~ 0 as k ~ ~.  For each 
k, let A~ and F* denote -~u saddle point strategies of the unconstrained penalty game (1), (2) and 
cost 
Jk,= J + rkJ p. (22) 
The following then holds: 
Proposition 3.3 
Let r k + t < rk. Then 
J, +, (A*+ ,, F*+l) < Jk (A*, F*). 
From Proposition 3.3 it follows that the sequence 
{j~ (A*, r*)} 
is a monotonically decreasing sequence of positive numbers and hence must converge to a number 
Joo >/0. We shall show below that J* = J(A*, F*) where J(A*, F*) is the value of the original 
event-constrainted differential game. 
Theorem 3.4 
Assume conditions (A1)-(Ag), (B1)-(B3) hold and let (to, x0) be in the interior of u's winning 
zone. For each r k in {rk} consider the penalty game associated with (1), (2) and (22). Then for each 
E > 0 there exists a positive number K such that for all k t> K, 
J(A*, F*) < Jk(A~', V*) ~< J(A*, F*) + e. (23) 
The inequality (23) provides the essential justification for employing the proposed penalty 
function approach for actual computation of optimal approximating strategies for the two players. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have developed an interior penalty function approach for computation of (approximately) 
optimal strategies in (event constrained) combat games. Theorem 3.4 provides the theoretical 
justification for our approach. 
It is interesting to make some qualitative observations. 
In combat games, the winning player "initiates" the combat. If he chooses the saddle point 
strategy A* (of the constrained game) then for every strategy F of his opponent, 
J(A*, F) ~ J(A*, F*), (24) 
so that his opponent has no incentive to deviate from the strategy F*. If, on the other hand, u 
decides to play an optimal penalty strategy A* (for any fixed chosen Fk), then it is true that 
Jk(A*, F) <<. Jk(A*, F*), (25) 
but it may still be true that 
J(A~', F) > J(A*, F*), (26) 
so that by selecting A*, u is making a sacrifice in terms of cost (of the original game) in favor of 
"security". The inequality (23) however bounds this conceivable sacrifice to within arbitrarily small 
limits specifiable by the winning player u. 
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